News18 What Progressives’ Growing Influence over President Biden’s Foreign Policy Means for India
Kashish Parpiani
The following article originally appeared in News18 on June 13 2021

The progressive ‘Squad’—Reps. Ilhan Omar, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, Ayanna Pressley—has been at the forefront of the progressive movement among young voters.

Under Donald Trump, the US witnessed a power tussle between the executive and the legislature over foreign policy decision-making. While such a tussle had been in the offing over the post-9/11 consolidation of powers by the executive, bipartisan and bicameral anxieties in the US Congress over Trump’s ‘America First’ approach only accentuated that tension. In guarding core tenets of post-Cold War US foreign policy, Republicans and Democrats passed stop-gap provisions to prevent Trump from downgrading US alliance commitments and even mandated congressional authorisation over the prospect of Trump engaging in military adventurism. Beyond this preservationist focus, following the 2018 midterms—which propelled Democrats to assume control of the House of Representatives—the 116th US Congress shaped Trump’s policy on China’s human rights record through resolutions on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet.

Ahead of the 2020 election, increased congressional role in foreign policy was expected to continue under Joe Biden, since he had acknowledged the need to reverse the executive’s consolidation of powers—particularly over US administrations’ misuse of post-9/11 Authorisations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs). However, unlike the Trump years, which witnessed congressional intervention in foreign policy through legislative efforts to curb executive authority, Biden’s foreign policy is being shaped by intra-party schisms.


Before the 2020 election, progressives in the Democratic Party deemed foreign policy as “an enormous area” for pushing Biden “in a more progressive direction”. In devising its electoral agenda, the Biden campaign also gave into progressives’ push on some issues (like refraining from out-hawking Trump on China), given Biden’s limited ‘room for manoeuvre’ on accommodating progressives on polarising domestic issues. However, post election, the influence of progressives over foreign policy was expected to be limited, in view of centrist Democrats assuming leadership positions in the 117th US Congress.

Despite intra-party clamour for a new generation of leadership, Rep. Nancy Pelosi was elected for her fourth non-consecutive term as Speaker of the House of Representatives, and four-term US Senator, Chuck Schumer became the Senate Majority Leader. In the 2020 election, instead of expanding their 232-197 House majority of the 116th Congress, Democrats slipped to a 219-211 majority in the 117th Congress. Centrists attributed that loss to the progressive agenda, since many Democrats ran on polarising prescriptions like “defund the police”. Such an assessment helped centrists sustain control of the Democratic caucus. However, the election did not underscore the electorate’s rejection of progressives.

This was apparent with the re-election of the progressive ‘Squad’—Reps. Ilhan Omar, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, and Ayanna Pressley—who have been at the forefront of the progressive movement amongst young voters. Freshmen progressives like Jamaal Bowman and Cori Bush won, after defeating centrist Democrats and party elites like 16-term Congressman Eliot Engel and 10-term Congressman William Lacy Clay Jr.

As a result, despite the overall Democratic caucus shrinking by a dozen seats, membership to the congressional progressive caucus continued to remain above its pre-2018 ‘Blue Wave’ midterms level—with 93 progressives amongst 219 Democrats in the 117th Congress. Hence, the centrist Democratic leadership has made way for progressives to assume primary membership on important House oversight committees, that hone influence over Biden’s domestic agenda.

On foreign policy, centrists have begun to toe the progressive line. Recently, this was evident amidst progressives calling attention to American complicity in Israeli actions against Palestinians. Prominent pro-Israel centrists (like, Sen. Chris Coons and Rep. Jerry Nadler) spoke out against Israeli police violence and evictions of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. This put pressure on the Biden White House to also craft a balanced position on underscoring support for Israel and also urging it to roll back evictions.

Similarly, Biden’s decision to merely suspend US support for the Saudi Arabia-led offensive in Yemen, spurred progressives to pressure centrists (including some Biden allies on the Hill) to push for more stringent action. This led to the Biden administration acting upon the 2019 Congressional mandate for the Director of National Intelligence to release an assessment on Riyadh’s role in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.


Following India’s abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir, New Delhi incurred attention under progressives’ push against Trump’s policy of “divorcing” values from foreign policy. At a House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) hearing in October 2019, progressives decried New Delhi’s communications blockade and detentions in Kashmir. Progressive Congresswomen Tlaib and Pramila Jayapal also tabled two House Resolutions on the matter. Then-Chair of HFAC, centrist Rep. Elliot Engel also joined progressives in the October 2019 hearing to focus on developments in Kashmir. However, an intra-party schism on the matter had been apparent.

Following India’s abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, Engel had issued a joint statement with another centrist Democrat from the US Senate, Sen. Bob Menendez. In their statement, HFAC Chairman Engel and then-Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Menendez aligned with the Trump administration to not outrightly comment on India’s actions in Kashmir. Engel was also reported to have been involved in stalling progressives’ House resolutions, which were critical of Trump’s ambivalence and New Delhi’s actions.

Subsequently, as discussed, Engel was ousted after being primaried by progressive candidate Jamaal Bowen. The progressive campaign against Engel largely focused on his foreign policy record, that stood in contrast with progressives’ push for US focus on human rights issues as a guiding principle for ties with adversaries and partners alike. Viewed in this context, Sen. Menendez’s (now, Chairman of the SFRC) public letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin—which urged him to raise the “deteriorating situation of democracy” during his visit to India in March 2021—possibly stemmed from political considerations to avoid his centrist colleague Rep. Engel’s fate.

In addition, Menendez’ letter hinted at limits to New Delhi’s “ability to work with the US on development and procurement of sensitive military technology.” Although Menendez invoked that threat with reference to India’s defence ties with Russia, it came at a time when progressives have been clamouring for conditioning US arms exports as per human rights concerns.

Shortly after Austin’s visit to India, the Biden administration cleared its first arms sale for India, with the Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announcing the sale of six P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft. Concurrently, the DSCA also sent a notification on the sale to HFAC and SFRC, as per the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) which permits legislators to raise concerns within 30 days of receiving the notification.

Although that 30-day window has now elapsed in case of the P-8I sale (which renders the Biden administration free to proceed with the sale), the period coincided with increased rancour by progressives to legislatively block Biden’s US $735 million arms sale to Israel over human rights concerns. While the Congressional Research Service notes that the Congress has “never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale by use of a joint resolution of disapproval”, it remains to be seen if progressives seek an expansion of legislative powers on this aspect. For instance, in the 115th and 116th Congress, progressives sought amendments to AECA to align House procedures with the Senate, over legislators in the House also having the right to “force debate on the House floor” if HFAC does not raise concerns over a sale.

However, progressives’ rising influence over Biden’s foreign policy has also proved instrumental in resolving some divergences in India-US ties. As India grappled with a resurgent wave of the coronavirus pandemic, the Biden administration oversaw a ‘whole of society’ mobilisation of aid from USAID, corporate America, India-centric trade advocacy groups, and even the Indian diaspora.

In its support for India, the Biden administration also rolled back its restriction on the export of vaccine raw-materials. However, on Biden’s holdout on India and South Africa’s appeal at the WTO for a temporary waiver of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) for COVID-19 vaccines, progressives lent the required push.

In reviving the intra-party tussle over ‘pro-worker progressivism’ and ‘anti-corporate progressivism’, progressives criticised Biden for prioritising pharmaceutical companies’ profits by maintaining exclusivity on vaccine production. Despite the Biden administration rationalising its opposition to the waiver under its ‘pro-worker’ agenda to bolster America’s domestic production base, the progressive pushback gathered support from centrists as well. This eventually led to the Biden administration announcing US support for the TRIPS waiver.

Hence, under Biden, India-US ties face mixed prospects with progressives in the Democratic Party seeking a reformist bent to the US Congress’ preservationist role in foreign policy decision-making.

News18 The Joe Biden Worldview and its Implications for India
Kashish Parpiani
The following article originally appeared in News18 on September 9 2020

Although Biden has invoked Trump’s Indo-Pacific construct to promise continuity on US-India ties, the US Congress’ shift to a reformist — from its current preservationist, role could pose challenges.

Democratic presidential nominee and former Vice President Joe Biden has deemed President Donald Trump to have “abdicated American leadership”. In contrast, the Biden campaign has construed their candidate as someone who would restore America’s place “back at the head of the table.” As with his promise to “return to normalcy” on the domestic front, Biden’s foreign policy agenda also seems to be “looking at an across-the-board restoration project”. This includes invocation of familiar themes over the indispensable nature of US leadership and an expansive scope of threats facing America.

From the standpoint of US-India ties, if Biden wins, he would be the third US president that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would do business with. However, in addition to Biden’s time as Barack Obama’s vice president, he is seen as an old hand on Washington’s relations with New Delhi given his experience as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the passage of the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2008, and as the co-sponsor of a legislation (Naval Vessels Transfer Act of 2005) which led to India’s acquisition of the first US-built warship.

However, some commentators have warned of impending challenges under a Biden presidency owing to the Democrats’ heightened focus on defending values through America’s foreign policy.


At the October 2019 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on human rights in South Asia, Democrats rallied against Trump’s ambivalence towards the Modi government’s abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir and the communications lockdown that followed. Whereas, Republicans sought to temper criticism by making a case against Washington’s “high standards” on human rights — in-line with Trump’s idea of “divorcing” foreign policy from values, and some even called for the Modi government’s actions to be “applauded”. This partisan divergence on India stood compounded with the US-India dynamic being subject to politicisation from either sides. Cases in-point being, optics of Modi seeming to endorse Trump’s reelection at the ‘Howdy, Modi!’ rally (New Delhi has denied this), and the use of Modi’s speech at the ‘Namaste, Trump!’ event in Trump’s campaign advertisement aimed at courting the Indian American electorate.

Going forward, if a Democrat-controlled US Congress (given reports of their probability of taking over the US Senate) views US-India ties to have been politicised to the further detriment of shared values, their criticisms may be employed as a means to spur a change in behaviour.

Under Trump, a bipartisan effort to preserve some tenets of American internationalism against ‘America First’ impulses has been prevalent. However, following the 2018 midterms which led to a Democratic majority in the US House of Representatives, an effort to project an American foreign policy that ought-to-be also emerged. This included, increased scrutiny of Trump’s foreign policy owing to the House’s oversight powers (as with hearings on Trump’s Syria policy), contrasting Trump’s support for populism abroad (as with Democrats declaring their opposition to a no-deal Brexit threatening the Good Friday Agreement), and pushing a focus on human rights issues (as with mandating Trump to act on Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Honk Kong).

Under Biden, a Democrat-led House and Senate may not play such a preservationist role. Instead, it could seek to reform Biden’s foreign policy as commentators warn against his return to “a narrow Washington consensus that has failed our country and the world.” Although this may not occur in Biden’s initial years as pressing domestic agendas would take precedence, such a role can be imagined in view of the reported trend of progressives — that view Biden as a “man of the past” due to his promise of a restorationist foreign policy, ousting Democrat establishment incumbents in Congressional primaries this year.

In case of US-India ties, this could include invocation of Congressional authority to link the confirmation of envoys or clearance of arms sales to the Biden administration’s commitment to press New Delhi on issues over civil-liberties. One may argue, the prospect of this occurring would be in the long-shot of concerns eclipsing the many strategic convergences between New Delhi and Washington. However, a lot may depend on the Democrats’ evolving characterisation of the Modi dispensation — which some progressive legislators have already alleged of spreading “violent Hindu nationalism and hate crimes against Muslims.”

Moreover, in a sign of such voices already having considerable sway over Biden, recently, his campaign’s ‘Agenda for Muslim-American Communities’ noted the situation in Kashmir alongside references to the internment of Uyghurs in China and atrocities against Rohingyas in Myanmar, as instances that “pain” Muslim-Americans. Thereafter, following an uproar by other sections of the Indian American community, the Biden campaign underscored its vision for US-India ties.


Speaking at an event on India’s Independence Day, Biden said India and the US “share a special bond that I’ve seen deepen over many years.” His campaign also announced, “Biden will deliver on his long-standing belief that India and the United States are natural partners, and a Biden administration will place a high priority on continuing to strengthen the US-India relationship.” Biden’s campaign also released its ‘Agenda for the Indian American Community’, which is reportedly the first-ever such policy paper by a presidential campaign. Wherein, in a sign of policy continuity, it invoked the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific construct to underscore Biden’s commitment to “work with India to support a rules-based and stable Indo-Pacific region in which no country, including China, is able to threaten its neighbors with impunity.”

Furthermore, it hailed the Obama-Biden years’ record of supporting New Delhi’s capacity-building with the Major Defense Partner (MDP) designation in order “to ensure that when it comes to the advanced and sensitive technology that India needs to strengthen its military, India is treated on par with our closest partners.” Biden’s support on this front would also constitute a point of continuity, given the Trump administration’s record of not only continuing the MDP designation but also furthering the same with its classification of India under the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 category and finalising the Industrial Security Annex to facilitate transfer of sensitive technologies.

In addition, under Biden’s ‘normal’ foreign policy, one can expect a dampening of trade tensions that have come to mar bilateral ties under Trump. Although Biden has criticised Trump’s approach of levying tariffs as “alienating our allies and undermining the power of our collective leverage”, pressure to continue negotiations on India’s tariff/non-tariff barriers would likely persist. However, the Biden administration would differ in terms of not having such divergences play out in the open — in-line with the Obama administration’s ‘Carter mantra’ which dictated harnessing of strategic convergences without allowing differences to crowd out “minimal-yet-positive developments.”

However, US apprehensions over India’s ties with Russia could reemerge. Although the main scope of Democrats’ criticism of the Vladimir Putin regime remains to be election interference, Biden has also criticised Moscow’s use of Western financial institutions. In hinting at the possibility of US retaliation in this realm under a Biden presidency, prospects of India facing US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act could reignite. Although Trump has not accorded a waiver to New Delhi as per the provisions passed under Section 231 of the legislation, his administration has also not come down hard on India as in case of Turkey, for instance. Under a Biden presidency, questions over continuity on this ‘tacit waiver’ could assume the fore. Moreover, even if Biden were to pursue constructive ties with Russia on pressing matters like extending the New START treaty — a key foreign policy win of the Obama-Biden years, which expires in February 2021, a progressive US Congress could force his administration to get tough on Moscow on other avenues, such as its international dealings.

Certainly, it would be unfair to say that Biden would entirely remain beholden to power balances on the Capitol Hill, especially since foreign policy is mostly a domain of the executive branch under the “wide array of associated or “implied” powers” of Article II of the US Constitution. Hence, for instance, the trajectory of US-India counterterrorism cooperation or even the future of the QUAD with US-India defence interoperability at its core — two avenues that would interestingly also constitute points of continuity with Trump, would largely be animated by the Biden administration.

However, on other promises like Biden’s announced plan to reform the H-1B visa system and eliminate the limits on employment-based green cards by country, the role of the US Congress cannot be understated. Biden’s plan to “protect American and foreign workers alike” to ensure that “employers are not taking advantage of immigrant workers” which leads to undercutting of native-born workers on wages and opportunities, would require a comprehensive legislative undertaking to institute parity in wage levels. Moreover, against the backdrop of a downturn in the US economy and rise in unemployment due to the coronavirus pandemic, even if Democrats were to gain a comfortable majority in both chambers of the US Congress, odds of them spending their post-election political capital on Biden’s plan for foreign workers would be slim.

Hence, although Biden has invoked Trump’s Indo-Pacific construct to promise continuity on US-India ties, the US Congress’ shift to a reformist — from its current preservationist, role could pose challenges.