The Times of Israel Congressional Democrats & Biden’s foreign policy
Kashish Parpiani
The following article originally appeared in The Times of Israel on June 18 2021

Following an expansion of Congressional role in foreign policy decision-making under Trump, the influence of progressive Democrats over Biden’s agenda bears mixed prospects for India-US ties



Under Donald Trump, the US witnessed a power tussle between the executive and the legislature over foreign policy decision-making. While such a tussle had been in the offing over the post-9/11 consolidation of powers by the executive, bipartisan and bicameral anxieties in the US Congress over Trump’s ‘America First’ approach only accentuated that tension. In guarding core tenets of post-Cold War US foreign policy, Republicans and Democrats passed stop-gap provisions to prevent Trump from downgrading US alliance commitments and even mandated congressional authorisation over the prospect of Trump engaging in military adventurism. Beyond this preservationist focus, following the 2018 midterms—which propelled Democrats to assume control of the House of Representatives—the 116th US Congress shaped Trump’s policy on China’s human rights record through resolutions on Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet.

Ahead of the 2020 election, increased congressional role in foreign policy was expected to continue under Joe Biden, since he had acknowledged the need to reverse the executive’s consolidation of powers—particularly over US administrations’ misuse of post-9/11 Authorisations for the Use of Military Force (AUMFs). However, unlike the Trump years, which witnessed congressional intervention in foreign policy through legislative efforts to curb executive authority, Biden’s foreign policy is being shaped by intra-party schisms.



Rising currency of Progressives

Before the 2020 election, progressives in the Democratic Party deemed foreign policy as “an enormous area” for pushing Biden “in a more progressive direction”. In devising its electoral agenda, the Biden campaign also gave into progressives’ push on some issues (like refraining from out-hawking Trump on China), given Biden’s limited ‘room for manoeuvre’ on accommodating progressives on polarising domestic issues. However, post election, the influence of progressives over foreign policy was expected to be limited, in view of centrist Democrats assuming leadership positions in the 117th US Congress.

Despite intra-party clamour for a new generation of leadership, Rep. Nancy Pelosi was elected for her fourth non-consecutive term as Speaker of the House of Representatives, and four-term US Senator, Chuck Schumer became the Senate Majority Leader. In the 2020 election, instead of expanding their 232-197 House majority of the 116th Congress, Democrats slipped to a 219-211 majority in the 117th Congress. Centrists attributed that loss to the progressive agenda, since many Democrats ran on polarising prescriptions like “defund the police”. Such an assessment helped centrists sustain control of the Democratic caucus. However, the election did not underscore the electorate’s rejection of progressives.

This was apparent with the re-election of the progressive ‘Squad‘—Reps. Ilhan Omar, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, and Ayanna Pressley—who have been at the forefront of the progressive movement amongst young voters. Freshmen progressives like Jamaal Bowman and Cori Bush won, after defeating centrist Democrats and party elites like 16-term Congressman Eliot Engel and 10-term Congressman William Lacy Clay Jr.

As a result, despite the overall Democratic caucus shrinking by a dozen seats, membership to the congressional progressive caucus continued to remain above its pre-2018 ‘Blue Wave’ midterms level—with 93 progressives amongst 219 Democrats in the 117th Congress. Hence, the centrist Democratic leadership has made way for progressives to assume primary membership on important House oversight committees, that hone influence over Biden’s domestic agenda.

On foreign policy, centrists have begun to toe the progressive line. Recently, this was evident amidst progressives calling attention to American complicity in Israeli actions against Palestinians. Prominent pro-Israel centrists (like, Sen. Chris Coons and Rep. Jerry Nadler) spoke out against Israeli police violence and evictions of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. This put pressure on the Biden White House to also craft a balanced position on underscoring support for Israel and also urging it to roll back evictions.

Similarly, Biden’s decision to merely suspend US support for the Saudi Arabia-led offensive in Yemen, spurred progressives to pressure centrists (including some Biden allies on the Hill) to push for more stringent action. This led to the Biden administration acting upon the 2019 Congressional mandate for the Director of National Intelligence to release an assessment on Riyadh’s role in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi.



Implications for India-US ties

Following India’s abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir, New Delhi incurred attention under progressives’ push against Trump’s policy of “divorcing” values from foreign policy. At a House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) hearing in October 2019, progressives decried New Delhi’s communications blockade and detentions in Kashmir. Progressive Congresswomen Tlaib and Pramila Jayapal also tabled two House Resolutions on the matter. Then-Chair of HFAC, centrist Rep. Elliot Engel also joined progressives in the October 2019 hearing to focus on developments in Kashmir. However, an intra-party schism on the matter had been apparent.

Following India’s abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, Engel had issued a joint statement with another centrist Democrat from the US Senate, Sen. Bob Menendez. In their statement, HFAC Chairman Engel and then-Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) Menendez aligned with the Trump administration to not outrightly comment on India’s actions in Kashmir. Engel was also reported to have been involved in stalling progressives’ House resolutions, which were critical of Trump’s ambivalence and New Delhi’s actions.

Subsequently, as discussed, Engel was ousted after being primaried by progressive candidate Jamaal Bowen. The progressive campaign against Engel largely focused on his foreign policy record, that stood in contrast with progressives’ push for US focus on human rights issues as a guiding principle for ties with adversaries and partners alike. Viewed in this context, Sen. Menendez’s (now, Chairman of the SFRC) public letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin—which urged him to raise the “deteriorating situation of democracy” during his visit to India in March 2021—possibly stemmed from political considerations to avoid his centrist colleague Rep. Engel’s fate.

In addition, Menendez’ letter hinted at limits to New Delhi’s “ability to work with the US on development and procurement of sensitive military technology.” Although Menendez invoked that threat with reference to India’s defence ties with Russia, it came at a time when progressives have been clamouring for conditioning US arms exports as per human rights concerns.

Shortly after Austin’s visit to India, the Biden administration cleared its first arms sale for India, with the Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announcing the sale of six P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft. Concurrently, the DSCA also sent a notification on the sale to HFAC and SFRC, as per the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) which permits legislators to raise concerns within 30 days of receiving the notification.

Although that 30-day window has now elapsed in case of the P-8I sale (which renders the Biden administration free to proceed with the sale), the period coincided with increased rancour by progressives to legislatively block Biden’s US $735 million arms sale to Israel over human rights concerns. While the Congressional Research Service notes that the Congress has “never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale by use of a joint resolution of disapproval”, it remains to be seen if progressives seek an expansion of legislative powers on this aspect. For instance, in the 115th and 116th Congress, progressives sought amendments to AECA to align House procedures with the Senate, over legislators in the House also having the right to “force debate on the House floor” if HFAC does not raise concerns over a sale.

However, progressives’ rising influence over Biden’s foreign policy has also proved instrumental in resolving some divergences in India-US ties.

As India grappled with a resurgent wave of the coronavirus pandemic, the Biden administration oversaw a ‘whole of society’ mobilisation of aid from USAID, corporate America, India-centric trade advocacy groups, and even the Indian diaspora. In its support for India, the Biden administration also rolled back its restriction on the export of vaccine raw-materials. However, on Biden’s holdout on India and South Africa’s appeal at the WTO for a temporary waiver of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) for COVID-19 vaccines, progressives lent the required push.

In reviving the intra-party tussle over ‘pro-worker progressivism’ and ‘anti-corporate progressivism’, progressives criticised Biden for prioritising pharmaceutical companies’ profitsby maintaining exclusivity on vaccine production. Despite the Biden administration rationalising its opposition to the waiver under its ‘pro-worker’ agenda to bolster America’s domestic production base, the progressive pushback gathered support from centrists as well. This eventually led to the Biden administration announcing US support for the TRIPS waiver.

Hence, under Biden, India-US ties face mixed prospects with progressives in the Democratic Party seeking a reformist bent to the US Congress’ preservationist role in foreign policy decision-making.



The Times of Israel Is Trump reinstating a values-centric US foreign policy towards China?
Kashish Parpiani
The following article originally appeared in The Times of Israel on October 17 2018

Trump decries linkage of values & policy but his China policy may be an exception

On mounting pressure to punish Saudi Arabia for its alleged involvement in the disappearance of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi, Trump recently announced that he wouldn’t prefer to impose sanctions. Referring to impending U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia worth billions, he said, “This took place in Turkey and to the best of our knowledge, Khashoggi is not a United States citizen… I don’t like stopping massive amounts of money that’s being poured into our country.” This apparent cold realpolitik fed a flurry of articles and denunciations on the president’s unwillingness to uphold liberal democratic values vis-à-vis socio-political and human rights violations abroad. By contrast, the Trump administration’s policy towards China is increasingly laden with derisions of its record on socio-political freedoms.

Earlier this month, Vice President Pence delivered a major policy speech underscoring the Trump administration’s policy towards China. Pence noted the “hope” of China expanding freedom –– “not just economically, but politically, with a newfound respect for classical liberal principles, private property, personal liberty, religious freedom –– the entire family of human rights”, to have “gone unfulfilled.” He portrayed China as “an unparalleled surveillance state” that aimed to “drastically” restrict “the free flow of information to the Chinese people.” Pence even accused Beijing of wanting to “implement an Orwellian system premised on controlling virtually every facet of human life.”

Further, he went on to list instances of religious persecutions. With respect to Chinese Christians, Pence accused the Chinese authorities of “tearing down crosses, burning bibles, and imprisoning believers.” On Beijing “cracking down” on Buddhism, Pence referenced “more than 150 Tibetan Buddhist monks” to have “lit themselves on fire to protest China’s repression of their beliefs and their culture.” As for the state of Islam in the Xinjiang province, he accused Beijing to have “imprisoned as many as one million Muslim Uyghurs in government camps” in an attempt to “strangle Uyghur culture and stamp out the Muslim faith.” Finally, he also assailed against Chinese attempts to stifle freedom across academia, entertainment and the media.

This iteration of American policy towards China came as a welcomed contrast to Trump administration’s disdain for a linkage of values and policy. In characterising Trump’s ‘America First’ policy in early 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson spoke of decoupling US foreign policy and values. On U.S.’ commitment to human rights and socio-political freedoms around the world, he notably deemed them as American “values” and “not our policies.” The Trump administration’s maiden National Security Strategy also noted an interests-heavy approach and emphasised a disdain for a values-policy linkage with the disclaimer: “We are not going to impose our values on others.”

One may argue that with respect to China, however, the pertinence of a values-centric U.S. foreign policy has been a standard fixture. The same can be traced back to the 1959 speech by then-Senator John F. Kennedy, in which he deemed “Red China” to have sought a “route of regimented controls and ruthless denial of human rights.”

Further, the values-centric approach towards China continued well into the post-Cold War U.S. worldview –– from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice deeming China’s sentencing of human rights activists as “deeply disturbing” to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stating that China “should face consequences and international condemnation” for its internet freedom restrictions.

From a pure realpolitik standpoint, one may even argue that a values-centric approach was bound to become a standard fixture, as China was “replacing the Soviet military of the pre-Gorbachev years and the Japanese economy of the 1970s as the next big purported threat to American global leadership.” For instance, in the 1992 U.S. presidential election, the need for an assertive U.S. policy towards China was at the fore. Referring to the events of June 1989 in Tiananmen Square, then-Governor Bill Clinton rallied against American ambivalence especially when “all those kids went out there carrying the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square.” Once in office, President Clinton even walked the talk to oversee the passing of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act –– which required him to annually review the decision to continue to accord the Most-Favoured-Nation status to China contingent on its improvements on the human rights front.

However, the centrality of the values-centric approach in U.S. policy fizzled overtime. First, in view of China’s large market potentialities, the U.S. adopted a pragmatic, economic-centric approach. Encapsulated in its attempt to induct China as a “responsible stakeholder” in the U.S.-led world order, the Permanent Normal Trade Relations was passed to end the “annual ritual of reviewing China’s trade status”, and eventually pave way for China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation.

Second, the three Ts –– Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen –– that dominated the values-centric approach, stood dampened, as China’s relative military advantage vis-à-vis Taiwan grew, the state-sponsored Sinicisation of Tibet marginalised the natives, and the Tiananmen incident faded in Chinese collective memory due to stringent internet censorship.

Under its declared return of an era of “great power competition”, the Trump administration has adopted a confrontational approach towards China with the increased adoption of trade tariffs and a steady frequency of U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea. Additionally, there also seems to be an attempt to reinstate the U.S. values-laden approach.

On Taiwan, the Trump administration has not shied away from lauding Taiwan’s “embrace of democracy” as representing “a better path for all the Chinese people.” Although some past U.S. administrations have done so, the post-normalisation precedent has largely been to temper U.S. endorsements as the Communist Party of China has long viewed the same as an “all-out Westernisation” campaign to dislodge its rule. The Trump administration has, however, doubled-down not only by considerably ramping up defence exports to Taiwan, but by also entering the China-Taiwan diplomatic fray. Last month, it recalled U.S. ambassadors to the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama for their decision to no longer recognise Taiwan. Moreover, Trump also signed the Taiwan Travel Act to “permit high-level Taiwanese officials to enter the United States under respectful conditions and to meet with U.S. officials, including officials from the Departments of State and Defense.” The same challenges the ‘One China’ policy’s unstated dictum of refraining to host Taiwanese delegations which may be construed as according implied recognition of Taiwanese statehood.

On China’s restrictive visa policy, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018 by a unanimous voice vote. The bill aims to impose consequences for China’s restrictive access to Tibet which prevents “journalists from observing human rights abuses in Tibet and preventing Tibetan Americans from visiting their home country.” Under the bill’s provisions, Chinese authorities who are involved in the implementation of such restrictive visa polices will become ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted into the U.S.. Given the strong bipartisan nature of the bill –– backed by Congressional heavyweights like Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), President Trump is expected to sign the bill into law once it also passes the U.S. Senate with similar bipartisan vigour.

On Beijing’s attempts to censor the internet, the Trump administration laudably finds itself in agreement with Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to Protect Journalists. Back in August, these organisations and a dozen other international groups had penned a joint-letter urging Google CEO Sundar Pichai to cancel the development of the “Dragonfly” –– a censored search engine app for China. Reportedly, the Trump administration is also now coaxing Google to end its development of the app which it believes will “strengthen (Chinese) Communist Party censorship and compromise the privacy of Chinese customers”.

On China’s stifling of democratic movements, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently delivered a direct rebuke. On the banning of the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party, Pompeo deemed the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association to be “the core values we share with Hong Kong, and that must be vigorously protected.” Incidentally, this denunciation followed China’s refusal of a port call (slated for October) in Hong Kong by the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp. According to a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, the same was purportedly refused “in accordance with the doctrine of sovereignty and specific situation.”

Finally, the Trump administration is also reportedly mulling over the idea of imposing sanctions against Chinese senior officials and companies in view of Beijing’s detention of minority Muslims in Xinjiang.

Thus, in now pursuing its “great power competition” policy vis-à-vis China, the Trump administration seems poised to reinstate China’s record on socio-poltical freedoms –– in addition to U.S. concerns over Chinese trade practices and military assertiveness, as a major bone of contention.

The Times of Israel Trump’s Exemptionalist US Foreign Policy
Kashish Parpiani
The following article originally appeared in The Times of Israel on July 15, 2018

Under President Trump, the United States seems to adopting an unprecedented antagonistic stance against the institutions, commitments, and unpronounced precedents alike, of the liberal world order that the US itself put in place in the aftermath of the Second World War.

This month, reports revealed the Trump administration is considering to spur the United States’ withdrawal from the World Trade Organisation (WTO). According to reports, President Trump ordered his staffers to prepare a draft legislation that would essentially nullify the United States’ commitment to WTO rules. Apparently, the President was briefed on the resultant draft legislation – titled the “United States Fair and Reciprocal Tariff Act”, in late May. Although the chances of such a legislation going through the US Congress are slim, the withdrawal would come at the heels of Trump administration’s withdrawal from the United Nations Human Rights Council last month.

The same was the latest in the Trump administration’s list of exercising US “exemptionalism” – the other prominent US withdrawals being from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) and the Paris Climate Agreement. In addition to the evident motivation of undoing his predecessor’s legacy, one may argue that President Trump’s adoption of “exemptionalism” does not really constitute an overt departure in US foreign policy. This untoward tradition of US foreign policy is often defined as the United States’ unwillingness to be “bound by multilateral regimes and agreements to the same extent as other states.” Some prominent historical examples of which are, the United States having the dubious distinction of being one of the few holdouts from critical multilateral fora such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

In many of these cases, the rationale behind not having America bound by such multilateral engagements pertain to a strong belief in American Exceptionalism. For instance, in case of CEDAW, a report by the US Congressional Research Service noted one of the leading arguments presented by its naysayers to be the view that the United States is “already an international leader in promoting and protecting women’s rights.”

In other cases, administrations have often justified their exercise in “exemptionalism” with allegations of multilateral agreements “undercutting” American sovereignty. A notable example of the same, is the George W. Bush administration’s move to scuttle the Kyoto protocol. Similarly, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement bore resemblances to this brand of “exemptionalism” that derides multilateral arrangement’s impingement of American sovereignty.

However, under the real-estate mogul turned US Commander-in-Chief, another brand of US “exemptionalism” seems to be coming to the fore. Recent developments – the ‘G6 plus Trump’ debacle and the pageantry-filled Trump-Kim summit in Singapore, indicate President Trump to be lobbing systematic blows to the institutionalised dictums of US foreign policy. Simply put, the Trump brand of US exemptionalism goes one step further than usual to pursue a systematic dismemberment of the US-led world order.

Under President Trump, the United States seems to adopting an unprecedented antagonistic stance against the institutions, commitments, and unpronounced precedents alike, of the liberal world order that the US itself put in place in the aftermath of the Second World War. In fact, so grave is this emerging Trump brand of “exemptionalism” that a recent opinion piece in The New York Times declared the Trump administration to be ready to “pull down the liberal order, with America at its helm, that remains the best guarantor of world peace humanity has ever known. We are entering a new, terrifying era.” Meanwhile, The Economist with its cover story – with Trump sitting atop planet earth riding it as a wrecking ball, issued a warning against the consequences of Trump’s “demolition theory of foreign policy.”

Consider last month’s G7 summit. The same was a nail-biting event for foreign policy watchers – not because contentious global governance issues like climate change were on the agenda, but because the President of the United States engaged in proverbial fist fights with some of America’s oldest allies. Captured for posterity in the photograph that went viral, other members of the G7 grouping were reported to have had a trying time warning a petulant US president about the perils of ‘America Alone’. At the summit, not only did Trump raise the specter of a trade war with America’s allies, he also – to the collective reverberating gasps of US foreign policy elites – argued for Russia to be readmitted into the grouping. Lastly, the American president accused allies of using the US as “a piggy bank everyone is robbing”, and flip-flopped over the United States signing the final summit communiqué underscoring the grouping’s collective commitment to oversee a “rules-based international order.”

Shortly thereafter, an unnamed senior Trump administration official reportedly surmised the ‘Trump Doctrine’ as “We’re America, Bitch!” Another administration official tugged on that idea to underscore the same as, “The president believes that we’re America, and people can take it or leave it.” Such is the emerging Trump brand of American “exemptionalism” – one so intoxicated on American economic and military primacy, that it counter-intuitively involves pursuing policies that “undermine the Western alliance, empower Russia and China, and demoralise freedom-seeking people around the world.”

The above assessment holds water in view of the relevance of the American “Internationalist” tradition in the post-Second World War era. The tradition’s mainstay being the crafting of an international order thriving on “free trade, multilateral cooperation, a global alliance network, and the promotion of democratic values.” Certainly this order – pushing economic interdependence under the guise of “globalisation” – remained Washington-led in terms of the US dollar underpinning the global financial system and concrete American security commitments keeping a lid on historical rivalries spanning from Western Europe to East Asia.

Most importantly, the same also produced unprecedented prosperity beyond American pocketbooks. A striking fact in support of that assertion is, “in 1981, 44% of the world’s population was living in extreme poverty. Today it’s 10%.” However, the egregiously named ‘Trump Doctrine’ of “We’re America, Bitch!”, involves adopting American “exemptionalism” even with respect to this “internationalist” tradition.

It is key to note, if deterrence is in the eye of the adversary, then Trump’s repeated open derision of US allies sets dangerous precedents. This is not to say that, all outstanding issues between America and her allies persist baselessly. However, adopting an overly confrontational predisposition against US allies and partners may encourage nation-states hostile to the US-led order to call the bluff on America’s oft-stated “iron-clad” commitment to her allies. The ramifications of which wouldn’t just mean instability in a said region, but a barrel-roll effect on the prosperity and security of the world — spurring ramifications that will not stop at border controls. A case in point is the recent dip in the Indian Rupee spurred by fears of a prospective “full-blown US-China trade war.”

Further, far from gaining any concrete steps towards North Korea’s “Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible” denuclearisation, President Trump’s highly anticipated summit with Kim Jong Un reflected more of the aforementioned Trump brand of American “Exemptionalism”. Amidst all the pageantry of the summit, President Trump lobbed another systematic blow to America’s preeminence in the region. Not only did Trump announce the cancellation of long-standing military exercises with Seoul and indirectly doubted the rationale behind stationing US troops in the region, but he also did so whilst adopting the North Korean rhetoric of referring to them as “provocative” and “war games”. Subsequent analyses of China being the “big winner” of this outcome of the summit hold credence in view of any possible downsizing of the US-led ‘hub & spokes’ alliance system in the Asia-Pacific being compatible with China’s assertive ambitions in the region.

More importantly, the announcement of the cancellation coming to the horrid surprise of the South Koreans (and the Pentagon!) is sure to raise doubts about the United States’ credibility as a security partner – especially in the eyes of newly-developing American partners like India.

In summation, it can be argued, just as Trump has hijacked the US Republican Party and hauled it further to the right with greater emphases on the politics of the “other”, on matters pertaining to US foreign policy too, Trump seems to be pursuing steps that may overtime consolidate an American worldview underpinned with zero-sum instincts.

However, the irony remains that, by practicing American “exemptionalism” over the United States’ post-Second World War role of underwriting the world order in search for “fair” or rectifying “bad” deals or mere symbolic political “wins”, President Trump is somewhat eulogising Washington’s own influence. Sustained for roughly three-quarters of a century, the same today seems to be inching towards its poetic erosion – recently surmised in the Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland’s statement, “… if history tells us one thing, it is that no one nation’s pre-eminence is eternal.”