The Hindu Seasoned faces who could aid the return of America
Harsh V. Pant, Kashish Parpiani
The following article originally appeared in The Hindu on November 30 2020

In line with his agenda of restoring America’s place in the world, Biden is banking on Obama-era liberal internationalists

The President-elect of the United States, Joe Biden, recently announced nominations for some key national security posts. During the campaign, Mr. Biden argued for a liberal internationalist foreign policy to “once more place America at the head of the table”. Whereby, Washington would reassume the role of a steward on global governance issues, lead in the advocacy of democratic values and human rights, and sustain its network of alliances from western Europe to northeast Asia. Given this restorationist agenda for “rescuing” U.S. foreign policy after Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ conduct, most of Mr. Biden’s nominations are veterans of the Barack Obama administration. However, the decision to nominate his former colleagues also seems to be a very calculated one.

The band back together

With Mr. Trump overseeing America’s withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO, Mr. Biden has tapped career diplomat Linda Thomas-Greenfield to represent Washington at the global high-table. Biden will also restate the post to cabinet rank, since Trump had it downgraded. Moreover, Ms. Thomas-Greenfield’s experience as Barack Obama’s Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (at the critical time of responding to the Ebola outbreak) would be particularly relevant in the U.S.’s effort to “increase trust with non-Western diplomats”, at a time when China has sought to do the same to expand its influence at the UN.

From the standpoint of rekindling America’s relationship with its prime allies, Mr. Biden’s nomination of former Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken for Secretary of State is significant. After Mr. Trump’s derision of Europe as America’s “foe” and for allegedly having “ripped off” Washington on collective security, European capitals will now deal with someone who is fluent in French and considers them as partners of “first resort, not last resort.” In addition, the decision to tap former Secretary of State John Kerry as Special Presidential Envoy for Climate is reflective of the high priority Mr. Biden would accord to the issue. Apart from Mr. Biden’s pledge to reverse Mr. Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement (which Mr. Kerry helped negotiate), he is expected to elevate the position as part of his National Security Council.

Finally, Jake Sullivan, who most recently served as National Security Adviser to Vice-President Biden, will “take on the same title — but now to a President Biden”. His appointment as the gate-keeper of Mr. Biden’s national security agenda, will most definitely have bearing on Mr. Biden’s pledge to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal, since Mr. Sullivan was a key player in the secret negotiations that led to the 2015 deal. During his time as the Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Mr. Sullivan also worked on the implementation of her ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy — arguably the early precursor to the Indo-Pacific strategy.

The India outlook

Most analyses already predict considerable continuity when it comes to U.S.-India ties under Mr. Biden. With the nominations, that assessment gains further credence, with key members having had the experience of being part of the modern-day development of America’s ties with India. Mr. Blinken for instance, was staff director on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when as its chairman then-Senator Biden oversaw the passage of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. Similarly, Mr. Sullivan reportedly had been a supporter of U.S.-India ties being a central component of the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy.

In addition, the Biden administration’s agenda on India will hardly be different, given Mr. Trump’s own continuity on the Obama years’ progress on the U.S.-India portfolio. For instance, during the campaign, Mr. Blinken touted two Obama-era developments to underscore Mr. Biden’s commitment to U.S.-India ties. On both those developments — India’s designation as ‘Major Defence Partner’ and the initiation of the United States-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), Mr. Trump has only built on the Obama-Biden record by classifying India under the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 and finalising the Industrial Security Annex for the actualisation of the DTTI. Hence, while Mr. Blinken as Mr. Biden’s top diplomat would adopt a restorationist agenda towards most partners of the U.S., in case of India, the priority will be to further build on Mr. Trump’s record.

One aspect where things would depart from the Trump precedent however, is with respect to U.S. apprehensions over some of India’s domestic policies. Mr. Blinken for instance, has already spoken about there being “real concerns” over India “cracking down on freedom of movement and freedom of speech in Kashmir, [and] some of the laws on citizenship”. But he has pragmatically called for working on those “differences”, even as the U.S. and India continue to “build greater cooperation and strengthen the relationship.”

Handling China

Whereas on China, Mr. Blinken has reportedly been receptive to the idea of construing America’s approach on ideological lines. Whereby, in a sign of shedding the Obama-era baggage of over prioritising cooperation with China (to even ignore its transgressions), Mr. Blinken has rallied against Mr. Trump’s “signals of impunity” on Beijing’s human rights record. Towards now overseeing America’s reemergence to “a position of strength from which to engage China”, Mr. Blinken has notably invoked Mr. Trump’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct to call on India to be “a key partner in that effort”.

Hence, while differences over India’s domestic policies could emerge, increased attention on the China challenge by Mr. Biden’s team of Obama-era liberal internationalists could inform a pragmatic approach towards New Delhi.

The Hindu A Trump India visit, in campaign mode
Harsh V. Pant, Kashish Parpiani
The following article originally appeared in The Hindu on February 20 2020

With a trade deal unlikely, New Delhi must calibrate the costs and benefits of the U.S. President’s political tour

During U.S. President Donald Trump’s maiden visit to India on February 24-25, the U.S. and India were initially expected to sign a limited trade deal. Over the past three years, U.S.-India trade tensions have been escalating despite America’s trade deficit with India beginning to narrow and it being less than a tenth of the U.S.’s trade deficit with China.

As trade negotiations stalled, the Trump administration levied steel and aluminium tariffs on India, revoked India’s benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) programme, briefly contemplated limiting H1-B visas quota for Indians to 15% due to divergences on e-commerce policy, and raised the possibility of a Section 301 investigation into India’s tariff/non-tariff barriers to coerce India to eliminate practices that impede U.S. exports.

Defence package

India has reportedly finalised a defence package worth $3.5-billion for 24 MH-60R Seahawk maritime multi-role helicopters and six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters. In exchange, the expectation for India was the restoration of benefits under the GSP programme — under which, Indian exports worth $5.7-billion to the U.S. enjoyed duty-free status (2017).

However, a day after Mr. Trump’s visit dates were announced, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released a federal notice on eliminating a host of countries from its methodology for countervailing duty (CVD) investigations. India was removed from the list of developing countries that “are exempt from investigations into whether they harm American industry with unfairly subsidised exports”. With this move, the U.S. essentially closed the door on reinstating India’s benefits under the GSP, a preferential arrangement meant only for developing countries.

The timing of this move suggests Mr. Trump’s motivations pertaining to his India visit have little to do with tempering bilateral frictions. Instead, political motivations seem to be writ large. New Delhi will have to carefully calibrate the costs and benefits of Mr. Trump’s move.

‘America first’

Earlier this month, the U.S. Senate voted to acquit Trump on two articles of impeachment — abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. It was an expected outcome, as polarisation in American politics has accentuated with the U.S. Congress being divided into two partisan strongholds — the Democrats are in-charge of the House of Representatives and Republicans hold the Senate. However, given the fact that the impeachment proceedings prolonged well into an election year, the American electorate has not heard the last of it just yet. Mr. Trump was alleged to have sought a quid pro quo over U.S. military aid to Ukraine, in exchange for Ukraine’s assistance in acquiring dirt on former U.S. Vice-President and now Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden. In the upcoming elections, the allegation is expected to feature prominently in the Democrats’ attempt to deride the Trump administration’s values-bereft, transactional conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Concurrently, Mr. Trump has begun to hail his Senate acquittal as a matter of total exoneration. Moreover, in discrediting Democrats’ criticism on Mr. Trump’s conduct of American international relations in general, his re-election campaign is sure to outline the supposed gains of the “America First” world view.

It is here that a potential trade deal with “tariff king” India would be listed among other renewed partial/complete trade deals such as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA); renegotiated trade terms with South Korea, and Japan; and the “Phase One” deal with China, as instances of vindication. For instance, just days before the Democrats’ caucus in Iowa, Mr. Trump held a rally in Des Moines, Iowa. Citing his renewed trade deals and the Democrats’ opposition to his approach of exacting them, Mr. Trump said, “We’re going to win the great state of Iowa and it’s going to be a historic landslide.” He added, “And if we don’t win, your farms are going to hell.”

‘Namaste, Trump’

Moreover, with the India visit, the U.S. President has expressed his exhilaration over “millions and millions of people” that are expected to attend the “Namaste, Trump” event in Ahmedabad. With its pomp and ceremony, it is expected to be the Indian iteration of the “Howdy, Modi!” rally held late last year in Houston. Evidently, the same was an attempt to court the 270,000-strong Indian American community in the emerging battleground state of Texas. Similarly, the rally in Gujarat also holds relevance in terms of Mr. Trump’s political arithmetic for 2020. In visiting Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home turf, one can see the American President’s attempt to mobilise the Indian American community by showcasing his proximity to Mr. Modi’s India.

Mr. Trump’s political motivations notwithstanding, it would be prudent for India to not let the visit reflect as a partisan endorsement for his re-election. In recent years, American political polarisation has begun to erode the once-iron clad bipartisan consensus on U.S. foreign policy. In case of Congressional bipartisanship on India, that schism has emerged also due to the apparent partisan fervour of the “Howdy, Modi!” rally and House Democrats’ rising apprehensions on the communications lockdown in Kashmir.

Challenges for India could worsen in the coming years. If re-elected, Mr. Trump will possibly double-down on his will to seek renewed trade deals. At which point, remainder issues under U.S.-India trade ties could witness heightened tensions. Or, Congressional Democrats’ apprehensions may assume heightened vigour. Even in their worst-case scenario in 2020 of not winning back the White House, they are expected to, at the very least, chip away at the Republicans’ already slim majority in the Senate.

Moreover, working towards reinstating a certain sense of Indian neutrality on American polarisation would also make sense from the standpoint of the Senate entering an era of minimal majorities. The Republicans’ slim majority of 53-47, has opened the door to defections by legislators who do not always identify with the Trump agenda or do not mind crossing the aisle on initiatives that constrain Mr. Trump’s foreign policy decision-making.

Thus, with Mr. Trump’s visit, New Delhi must ensure its projection as a net gain for the bilateral relationship at-large — and not merely an extension of the U.S. President’s re-election campaign.