The European Union’s new strategy to reinforce partnership with India holds immense promise for India-EU cooperation on tech and innovation ecosystems.
This month, the European Union unveiled its new strategy to “reinforce prosperity and security” with India.
The Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council proposes structuring the India-EU cooperation agenda around five focus areas: prosperity and sustainability; technology and innovation; security and defense; connectivity and global issues; and enablers across pillars.
Moreover, it dispels any notion that the EU’s “Competiveness Compass” and India’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” focus are at odds. Instead, the EU Joint Communication on a New Strategic EU-India Agenda commits Europe’s regulatory expertise, single market access, and joint innovation to support India’s inclusive and sustainable growth.
The EU Joint Communication affirming Europe’s intent for deeper engagement with India comes amid ongoing India-EU trade negotiations for a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA). India’s Minister of Commerce Piyush Goyal recently said that it is important “not to let the search for a perfect deal become the enemy of progress,” adding that the direction of negotiations is “extremely positive.”
This sentiment was echoed by EU Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security (Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency) Maros Sefcovic, who said that India-EU trade negotiations have reached an unprecedented level of “seriousness, mutual trust, and shared ambition.” He even said that efforts are being “maximized to finalize the negotiations by the end of the year.”
This shared emphasis on conducting an FTA stems from the vast untapped potential of India-EU ties. In 2024, India-EU trade in goods reached 120 billion euros, making an increase of about 90 percent over the past decade. This was coupled with services trade rising to 60 billion euros. Around 6,000 European companies operate in India, and EU FDI in India reached 140 billion euros in 2023 – almost doubling over five years. Despite this encouraging trajectory, India accounts for just 2.5 percent of the EU’s total trade.
Hence, even as the two sides navigate the extensive scope of trade negotiations, the EU Joint Communication on India identifies “significant untapped potential” between the “natural strategic partners,” amid global instability caused by “weaponization of dependencies, unilateral trade practices, and widening economic asymmetries.”
This reference to challenges for deeper India-EU cooperation holds special significance amid the global implications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry.
Amid China-U.S. trade tensions, Beijing’s April 2025 decision to require licenses for exports of rare earth alloys, mixtures, and magnets sparked concerns for manufacturing operations across the world. Unlike China’s December 2024 decision on banning exports of gallium, germanium and antimony for the US, the global scope of the April 2025 decision demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to leverage its hold over production and refining of critical minerals.
Moreover, the Trump-Biden-Trump continuity on restricting China’s access to U.S.-made critical tech components raised compliance pressures for third countries. Recently, Malaysia announced permit mandates for export of U.S. AI semiconductors to clamp down against allegations of transshipment of tech components to China. Similarly, Singapore has cracked down against entities reportedly involved in routing of Nvidia’s chips to China’s DeepSeek.
The Trump administration has also continued Biden administration efforts to level the global playing field for American companies complying with U.S. restrictions on China’s access to chip-making equipment and maintenance services. This includes seeking additional compliances from Dutch and Japanese companies, despite Tokyo and Amsterdam aligning export mandates with U.S. regulations shortly after President Donald Trump assumed office in January 2025.
The impact of these widespread pressures of regulatory compliance was also apparent in the EU Joint Communication on India. It underscored that the two sides must “implement robust measures to prevent the unauthorized transfer or misuse of sensitive technologies and knowledge.”
More broadly, the China-U.S. tech rivalry has influenced an adaptive approach across the world. Like-minded nations are seeking long-term tech partnerships and collaborating on supply chain resilience, while also supporting indigenous efforts in tech domains. This trend has also been apparent in Indian and European initiatives.
Given this alignment on adapting to pressures of the China-U.S. tech rivalry, the EU Joint Communication rightly identifies “Technology and Innovation” as a dedicated cooperation track. This includes identifying priority areas under the India-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which was established in 2022 as a consultative ministerial platform to identify convergences at the intersection of trade and tech.
The EU Joint Communication recommends that the India-EU TTC prioritize the EU-India Semiconductor Agreement, cooperation on green technologies, and an early-warning system for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).
Such a directed focus under the India-EU TTC can help foster a collaborative research and development culture between India and Europe, through research partnerships, cross-pollination between start-up ecosystems, and joint skilling and development programs.
India and the EU may also draw on unique strengths, such as India’s successful deployment and expansion of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) platforms. Set up under the “Digital India” push, which celebrates its 10th anniversary this year, India’s DPIs have ushered in a revolution of financial inclusion, digital identity-based authentication, and transparent digital governance. The wide adoption of digital platforms has also bolstered India’s start-up ecosystem in the domains of fintech, edtech, and healthtech.
On this aspect as well, the EU Joint Communication makes some pertinent recommendations like setting up “EU-India Innovation Hubs” and “Blue Valleys” as multistakeholder convening platforms for investment facilitation, standards alignment, cross-sectoral collaboration, etc.
Hence, the recently-announced EU strategy on India accords new momentum to priority areas under the India-EU TTC and efforts to develop institutional and talent-mobility bridges between Indian and European tech ecosystems.
Recent India-Japan bilateral efforts to bolster tech and economic security draw on bilateral synergies and challenges posed by the China-U.S. rivalry.
Last week, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan for the 15th annual summit with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru. While this was Modi’s eighth visit to Japan since assuming office, the last iteration of the high-level bilateral summit was held in 2022.
As a result, Modi’s visit concluded with a comprehensive set of outcomes including a renewed 10-year India-Japan joint vision with eight clearly-defined focus areas, and a joint declaration on security cooperation.
The visit also witnessed an impetus to India-Japan economic security cooperation. A focus on this area was first seen in 2024, when the two sides convened the India-Japan Dialogue on Economic Security, including Strategic Trade and Technology.
The two sides’ convergence on economic security was apparent during the two prime ministers’ participation at the India-Japan Economic Forum. In his remarks, Modi hailed deepening India-Japan economic partnership as one between “trusted friends,” and “particularly relevant in the context of present turbulent global economic scenario.” Similarly, Ishiba voiced Japanese companies’ interest in exploring “partnerships between Indian talent and Japanese technology” to build resilient supply chains.
This alignment in the two leaders’ conception of India-Japan strategic partnership translated into another key outcome: the “Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange” to promote two-way exchange of skilled talent.
Moreover, Modi’s reference to the “turbulent global economic scenario” was pertinent, given the shared challenges faced by New Delhi and Tokyo.
India and Japan have both faced the ire of the United States, given the Trump administration’s focus on addressing long-standing market-access issues (chiefly, for U.S. agricultural exports) through the imposition of tariffs. In addition, concerted efforts on economic security, supply chain resilience, and cooperation on next-gen technologies under the Quad framework face an uncertain future, with recent reports indicating that U.S. President Donald Trump may not visit India for the Quad Leaders’ Summit this year.
In addition, the global ramifications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry lend further credence to Modi’s point on pressing externalities and the resultant need for like-minded nations (like India and Japan) to shore up economic security through tech and supply chain partnerships.
On stemming China’s tech advances, the present Trump administration has built on the precedents of the Biden administration, which in turn drew from the previous Trump administration’s use of export controls and investment screening mechanisms. This Trump-Biden-Trump continuity on China-U.S. tech rivalry is now drawing other nations into the fray.
For example, nations like Singapore and Malaysia are stepping up regulatory compliance to clamp down against transshipment of tech components to China.
The Trump administration’s country-by-country approach (as opposed to Biden’s tiered approach) on determining access to U.S.-made critical tech components has led to a scramble for semiconductors. Only some countries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have successfully navigated the resultant ambiguities to ink long-term partnerships with U.S. tech giants like Nvidia, AMD, Microsoft, etc.
Meanwhile, China has sought to highlight its own propositions, as a credible alternative to American tech components. This includes Huawei Technologies seeking to finalize export deals (for its Ascend 910B and 910C AI chips) with nations across the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Many nations have been caught between the binary choice of American or Chinese tech offerings. In May 2025, the U.S. warned against the use of Huawei’s Ascend processors, which it clarified were subject to export controls as they were “designed or manufactured using U.S.-origin technology.”
Moreover, China’s April 2025 retaliatory actions – chiefly over mandating licenses for export of rare earth alloys, mixtures, and magnets – have impacted supply chains and manufacturing operations globally. Unlike China’s December 2024 export ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony for the U.S. alone, the wide-ranging restrictions have underscored Beijing’s willingness to leverage its dominance in production and refining of critical minerals.
Last month, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi, India reportedly received assurances that China “will resume the much-needed supply” of fertilizers, rare earth minerals and tunnel boring machines as the two countries normalize relations.
Meanwhile, Japan has reportedly made considerable strides in reducing its dependence on Chinese rare earths, through strategic partnerships and coordination with its private sector.
For Japan, there are other direct implications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry. The Trump administration has reportedly following through on Biden-era efforts to level the global playing field for U.S. companies (like Lam Research, KLA and Applied Materials) complying with curbs on China’s access to semiconductor equipment. This U.S. effort includes seeking similar compliance from Dutch and Japanese companies (chiefly, Tokyo Electron Ltd.). In January 2025, Japan also mandated new export licenses (starting end-May 2025) from companies exporting advanced AI chips, high-end Lithography equipment and Cryocoolers.
With these unique but shared concerns over the global implications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry, it was timely and pertinent that India and Japan finalized the India-Japan Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Mineral Resources. This will help advance bilateral cooperation in supply chain resilience for critical minerals, including through development of processing technologies and joint investments for exploration, mining, and stockpiling critical minerals.
The commitment for acting on such bilateral convergences on economic security was also reflected in the joint statement issued at the conclusion of the 15th India-Japan Annual Summit. The Indian and Japanese prime ministers have “tasked their Foreign Ministries to accelerate policy level exchanges on economic security” including identifying projects in strategic sectors, in tandem with industry and academia, and “protecting high technology trade while mutually easing export control challenges.”
Similarly, as illustrated by the announcement of the “Action Plan for India-Japan Human Resource Exchange,” there was an evident bilateral intent to envisage long-term bridges between Indian and Japanese tech ecosystems. This was also reflected in the Indian and Japanese prime ministers emphasizing the “importance of support for startups” and aligning on “promoting activities of startups of both countries in India including through the Japan-India Startup Support Initiative (JISSI).”
During Modi’s visit, the two sides also highlighted developments on strengthening semiconductor supply chain under the Memorandum of Cooperation on India-Japan Semiconductor Supply Chain Partnership, which was finalized in July 2023.
Amid the new uncertainties plaguing the Quad, India and Japan rightfully also announced a dedicated track (one of eight) for cooperation on next-gen technologies under the renewed India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade, which offers direction for deepening the India-Japan strategic partnership.
Moreover, similar to the Quad’s focus on harnessing AI for development aims and synergizing standards, India and Japan also launched the India-Japan AI Cooperation Initiative to encourage institutional cross-pollination (across academia and private sector) and collaborative programs like developing Large Language Models (LLMs), to foster “a trustworthy AI ecosystem.”
Underpinned with a renewed ten-year vision for the India-Japan strategic partnership, New Delhi and Tokyo hold immense potential for harnessing each other’s strengths to guard against challenges posed by the China-U.S. tech rivalry.
The global implications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry have raised the imperatives for Quad cooperation on AI and semiconductors.
In July 2025, the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting concluded with announcements on strengthening maritime and transnational security, economic security, cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance across the Indo-Pacific region.
A significant takeaway of the convening was the launch of the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative to strengthen cooperation on securing and diversifying critical mineral supply chains.
The joint statement by the foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States underscored concerns over “abrupt constriction and future reliability of key supply chains, specifically for critical minerals.” They raised concerns about dependence on “any one country for processing and refining critical minerals and derivative goods production,” which may lead to “economic coercion, price manipulation, and supply chain disruptions.”
This development came amid global manufacturers raising alarms over China’s April 2025 decision to mandate licenses for export of rare earth alloys, mixtures, and magnets. China’s action followed its trade tensions with the U.S. – at the time, the Trump administration had mandated export licenses for a wider range of chips used in artificial intelligence (AI) applications and limited China’s access to chip-designing software.
Amid China’s bilateral trade and tech tensions with the United States, its decision to restrict rare earth exports impacted global supply chains and manufacturing (unlike China’s December 2024 export ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony for the U.S. alone). In addition, the move highlighted Beijing’s willingness to leverage its dominance in production and refining of critical minerals.
Such instances of the China-U.S. tech rivalry resulting in implications for the world have raised the imperatives for deeper tech cooperation among Quad members.
The first Trump administration (2017-21) used export controls to limit the flow of tech components to China, barred the use of federal funds to purchase Chinese tech equipment, and indicted Chinese tech companies for espionage activities.
While the Trump administration used these measures against China’s 5G equipment, the U.S. under President Joe Biden expanded the scope to also include other technologies. Under its “small yard and high fence” policy, the Biden administration (2021-2025) employed the Trump playbook and hailed export controls as “a new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.”
As a result, the Biden administration surpassed the Trump administration’s tally of Chinese companies added to the U.S. Commerce Department’s “Entity List.” Moreover, the Biden administration expanded the scope of restricted technologies to include semiconductors and also addressed Chinese “overcapacity” in clean energy tech (including solar cells and batteries).
The current Trump administration (2025-present) has followed through on the Biden administration’s tariffs on Chinese semiconductors (starting January 2025) and the December 2024 Section 301 probe into Chinese semiconductors used in American consumer products.
Moreover, with DeepSeek highlighting China’s advances in the AI domain, the Trump administration built on Biden’s 2022 and 2023 restrictions on export of AI-relevant chips to China. This included the April 2025 action on mandating export licenses for less-powerful variants of AI-relevant chips (which the Biden administration backed down from acting against) and the May 2025 restrictions on China’s access to chip-designing software.
The China-U.S. tech rivalry, now well into its ninth year, has had global implications.
Recently, Malaysia began mandating permits for export of U.S.-origin AI-relevant chips to clamp down against transshipment of components to China. Similarly, Singapore has cracked down on individuals allegedly involved in routing of Nvidia’s chips to China’s DeepSeek. The Trump administration has also continued pursuing the Biden-era goal of seeking compliance from Japanese and Dutch companies on curbing China’s access to semiconductor equipment.
In addition, the Trump administration’s decision to rescind the Biden-era “AI Diffusion Rule” has led to a scramble from nations seeking AI-relevant chips. The Biden-era rule had defined limits on export of semiconductors for nations categorized into three tiers. The Trump administration’s decision to not adopt this framework has led to a country-by-country approach, which was on display during Trump’s visit to the Gulf in May 2025. While hosting Trump, Saudi Arabia and the UAE finalized one-on-one agreements on access to American AI-relevant chips and partnerships with U.S. tech companies on AI infrastructure.
Ahead of the Quad Summit in India later this year, there is immense scope for further refining AI cooperation among Quad nations.
This may include a deeper focus on AI through research partnerships, cross-pollination between incubators, exploring joint workforce development programs, etc. Beyond research partnerships and institutional linkages, these steps can overtime develop bridges between Australian, Indian, Japanese, and American tech ecosystems on the mobilization of talent.
Given the recent developments on the China-U.S. tech rivalry, Quad nations may explore a “Joint AI Readiness Assessment” to determine areas of relative strength and areas of cooperation.
This can be along the lines of the bilateral assessment on semiconductors announced by the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) and India Electronics Semiconductor Association (IESA) under the India-U.S. initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET).
Such an assessment may also draw from the Memorandum of Cooperation for the Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network, which was finalized during the Quad Leaders’ Summit in September 2024.
Similarly, at the Quad Leaders’ Summit in May 2023, the Quad nations finalized the Quad International Standards Cooperation Network and the Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards. This effort to synergize standards across the tech ecosystems of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States may now also consider a similar undertaking on operational matters. This may include sharing of best practices on regulatory compliance mapping, upkeep of databases on licensing records, investment screening mechanisms, etc.
This can also be a focus area under the Track 1.5 dialogues on AI and Advanced Communications Technologies, which were announced by the Quad in 2024.
Finally, the Quad nations have rightly committed to harnessing AI to empower farmers under the Advancing Innovations for Empowering NextGen Agriculture (AI-ENGAGE) initiative. This initiative exploring AI’s applications at the ground level now also requires institutional heft, in terms of cooperation agreements between agri-tech companies, universities, research centers, etc. This may require financing from existing efforts like the Quad Fellowship’s expanding donor base or the Quad Investors Network (QUIN), which was launched at the 2023 Quad Leaders’ Summit.
Given the initiative’s aim to use AI for developmental needs, AI-ENGAGE can assume a central role in Quad tech cooperation, even as the China-U.S. tech rivalry raises regulatory and compliance-related challenges across the world.